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HOUSES ON THE SAND: TAKINGS ISSUES 
SURROUNDING STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE 
USE OF OCEANFRONT PROPERTY 
Harold N. Skelton* 
And everyone that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, 
shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the 
sand, and the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, 
and beat upon that house; and it fell; and great was the fall of it. 
Matthew 7:26 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The place where the ocean's power meets the mass of the continent 
is a unique and fragile environment. The coastal zone l is a dynamic 
system of moving sand and water vital to the quality of life along 
the seaboards. Beaches and near-shore sand systems2 absorb the 
erosive force of ocean tides and waves.3 They are also a first natural 
line of defense against the extraordinary energy of ocean storms. 
The sand system bears the brunt of these storms, buffering their 
severe winds and tides before they reach populated inland areas. 4 
• Articles Editor, 1990-1991, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 '''Coastal zone' means all coastal waters and submerged lands seaward to the State's 
jurisdictional limits and all lands and waters in the counties of the State which contain any 
one or more of the critical areas." S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The same 
section defines "critical area" as coastal waters, tidelands, beaches, and primary ocean-front 
sand dunes. [d. 
2 Georgia law states: "The General Assembly finds and declares that coastal sand dunes, 
beaches, sandbars, and shoals comprise a vital natural resource system, known as the sand 
sharing system, which acts as a buffer to protect real and personal property from the damaging 
effects of floods, winds, tides, and erosion ... " GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-231 (1982), cited in 
Pendergrast, The Georgia Shore Assistance Act, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 397 (1984). 
3 [d. 
4 W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, THE BEACHES ARE MOVING 27 (1983). 
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Thousands of acres of salt marsh provide protection for wildlife,5 and 
generate the tons of organic material, microorganisms, and crusta-
ceans on which near-shore marine life ultimately depends for food. 6 
The marshes are also essential barriers between the ocean and fresh 
water aquifers on which many inland communities depend. 7 Finally, 
the coastal zone represents an unparalleled recreational resource,8 
providing days tinctured with sun, clean sand and water, and pristine 
air. Those privileged to dwell in the coastal environment recognize 
its sublime beauty and inestimable value. 
The qualities that make the coastal zone an important resource 
make it one of the most desirable areas in which to live. 9 But the 
incessant change that lends the coast its drama also brings peril to 
its residents. The day-to-day forces of wind and tide constantly 
reshape the littoraPO geography. A storm of any magnitude can work 
changes sufficient to render sections of the coast unrecognizable. 11 
Those who build on the shore soon come to realize that their tenure 
there is limited to a grace period granted by these natural forces. 
Recognizing the dangers of erosion and storm or finding their 
properties imminently threatened, many littoral proprietors take 
steps to protect their holdings. 12 Others, less fortunate, face the 
5 Chatham, Mass., Wetlands Protection Regulations § 2.06(1) (Oct. 29, 1986). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
B South Carolina statutes provide: 
The General Assembly finds that: (1) The beach/dune system along the coast of South 
Carolina is extremely important to the people of this State and serves the following 
functions ... (d) provides a natural healthy environment for the citizens of South 
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental well-being 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-270 (Law Co-op. 1976) (editor's note). 
9 See W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 4, at 224. 
10 "Littoral" is an adjective meaning "of or existing on a shore." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 763 (New College ed. 1978). 
11 For a discussion of the effects of winds, tides and storms on barrier island geography, 
see S. LEATHERMAN, BARRIER ISLAND HANDBOOK 47-74 (1980). For a more general discus-
sion, see W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 4, at 65-83. 
12 Some of the devices proprietors may erect in an effort to protect their holdings are: 
(a) seawall: a special retaining wall designed specifically to withstand normal wave 
forces; 
(b) bulkhead: a retaining wall designed to retain fill but not withstand wave forces 
or an exposed shoreline; 
(c) revetment: a sloping structure built along a scarp or in front of a bulkhead to 
protect the shoreline or bulkhead from erosion; 
(d) groin: shore protective structure consisting of a long pile of rip-rap extending 
from the beach backshore into the surf zone, perpendicular to the shoreline. 
See S. LEATHERMAN, supra note 11, at 89-104. 
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necessity of rebuilding after calamity strikes. 13 State and local gov-
ernments, however, recognizing the value and fragility of the coastal 
environment, pass statutes and ordinances that limit proprietors' 
abilities to protect or rebuild. 14 The conflict thus engendered is the 
subject of this Comment. 
Littoral proprietors affected by restrictive regulations may bring 
"takings" suits against the governmental bodies that promulgate the 
regulations. 15 These suits allege that when governments prevent 
owners from building protective barriers on their properties or pre-
vent them from rebuilding ruined structures, the government's ac-
tions amount to uncompensated takings of private property in vio-
lation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 16 This Comment sets out a framework and method for 
examining littoral takings suits to determine whether they can be 
successful. 
Section II of this Comment describes recent events in Chatham, 
Massachusetts, and along South Carolina's Outer Banks. These 
events are presented as paradigms for the types of events and 
conflicts discussed in the remainder of the Comment. Section III 
discusses the common-law doctrine of reasonable use, and its rela-
tionship to analysis of takings claims in a littoral context. Section IV 
of this Comment discusses the relevant aspects of takings jurispru-
dence. Finally, Section V draws conclusions about the viability of 
littoral takings claims by analyzing the paradigms presented in light 
of the law developed. 
II. Two RECENT COASTAL DISASTERS 
A. Chatham, Massachusetts 
On January 2, 1987, a severe northeasterly storm combined with 
an unusually high tide to breach the barrier beach protecting 
Chatham Harbor and the headlands17 of the Town of Chatham, Mas-
13 See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text for examples of the destruction wrought 
by Hurricane Hugo in September of 1989. 
14 See infra notes 34--39, 57-59 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 40-41, 62 and accompanying text for descriptions of circumstances giving 
rise to two takings suits. 
16 See infra notes 81-84. 
17 "Headland" is a noun meaning "a point of land, usually high and with a sheer drop, 
extending out into a body of water; promontory." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 607 (New College ed. 1978). 
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sachusetts from the Atlantic Ocean. 18 The breach and its subsequent 
widening and north-south oscillation19 replicated patterns of change 
in Nauset Beach that recur in cycles of 140 to 150 years. 20 
To the historical observer, the barrier beaches protecting central 
Cape Cod represent an evolving system of shifting geologic features. 
From decade to decade, sand stripped from northerly beaches is 
deposited to form new barriers to the south. 21 Beaches thinned in 
this way are eventually breached. The new inlets widen and shift, 
yielding to the erosive force of tide and wind.22 As changing land 
forms redirect the energy of sea and storm, the beaches respond in 
a constant cyclical evolution.23 The current breach, locally referred 
to as "New Inlet," mirrors a previous "new inlet" that developed in 
1846.24 
Chatham's Nauset Beach is typical of the land forms enclosing 
thousands of miles of the coastal United States.25 These shifting sand 
forms protectively envelop the more geologically durable coastal 
mainland. The malleable beaches provide an absorbent buffer be-
tween populated headlands and the unimpeded energy of the open 
ocean and its storms. 26 Although breaches are expected and predict-
able in areas like Chatham,27 the effects of a breach can be extensive 
and devastating. 
The Chatham breach opened a section of the barrier beach that 
lay about a kilometer across Chatham Harbor from the inner shore. 28 
On the mainland, opposite the opening, stood an enclave of expensive 
waterfront homes owned by long-time summer and year-round res-
idents.29 By January of 1988, a year after the initial breach, New 
18 G. GIESE, D. AUBREY, & J. Lru, DEVELOPMENT, CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF 
THE NEW CHATHAM HARBOR INLET 1 (1988). 
19 See id. at 13-15. 
l'J) [d. at 3. 
21 [d. at 3-5. 
22 [d. 
23 See id. at 15, 18. 
24 See id. at 4, 14. 
25 See generally S. LEATHERMAN, supra note 11, at 1-18. These land forms include barrier 
islands, bay barriers, tombolos, and barrier spits. The land form protecting Chatham Harbor 
takes the form of a double barrier spit. [d. at 10. 
26 See G. GIESE, THE BARRIER BEACHES OF CHATHAM, MASSACHUSE'ITS 29 (1978). 
27 [d. at 31. 
28 United States Geological Survey: Chatham Quadrangle, Barnstable County, Massachu-
setts, 7.5 minute series (topographic). 
29 Gomez, Chatham Cottage Falls to Raging Sea, Boston Globe, Jan. 22, 1988, at 17, col. 
4. 
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Inlet had grown to over a mile in width.30 The now-unimpeded force 
of the winter Atlantic and its northeasterly storms pounded through 
the opening. Erosion of the inner shore accelerated tremendously. 31 
Homeowners who before the breach had crossed seventy-five yards 
of sandy beach to reach the harbor found their homes perched pre-
cariously on the edge of the sea. 32 
The affected property owners petitioned the Town of Chatham to 
allow them to build protective barriers, called revetments, in an 
effort to protect their homes.33 Although sympathetic to the plight 
of the homeowners, the town denied them the necessary construction 
permits because the anticipated revetments would have violated a 
state environmental-protection regulation. 34 
In relevant part, the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Regu-
lations prohibit any alteration of a coastal sand dune that could (1) 
affect the ability of waves to remove sand from the dune,35 (2) modify 
the dune so as to increase the potential for storm or flood damage ,36 
or (3) interfere with the lateral movement of the dune. 37 While the 
regulations permit certain minimal alterations to existing structures, 
they explicitly prohibit the construction of coastal engineering de-
vices.38 Because several of the threatened houses were situated on 
coastal dunes, the Town of Chatham denied their owners permission 
to build revetments. 39 
On January 21, 1988, the progress of the ocean's assault on the 
once-stable Chatham headlands could be measured in inches per 
minute. 4o On January 22, neighbors and town officials watched as a 
30 Richard, Owners Fight Time, Tide As Homes Falter, Boston Globe, Jan. 23, 1988, at 
26, col. 1. 
31 Gomez, supra note 29, at 17, col. 5. 
32 Hanafin, The Sea Closes in on Chatham Cottages, Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 
2. 
33 [d. at 21, col. 4. 
34 Fulham, Homeowners in Chatham Plan to Sue, Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1988, at 26, col. 
2. The regulation at issue was the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection regulation, MASS. 
REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 10.28(3)(a) (1987). 
35 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 1O.28(3)(a) (1987). 
36 [d. § 1O.28(3)(c). 
37 [d. § 1O.28(3)(e). 
38 [d. § 10.28(4). "Coastal engineering structure means but is not limited to, any breakwater, 
bulkhead, groin, jetty, revetment, seawall, weir, rip-rap or any other structure that is designed 
to alter wave, tidal or sediment transport processes in order to protect inland or upland 
structures from the effects of such processes." [d. § 10.23. 
39 Hanafin, supra note 32, at 6, cols. 4-5. 
40 Gomez, supra note 29, at 17, col. 5. 
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four-bedroom house belonging to New Jersey judge Benjamin Gal-
anti slid into the sea. 41 In the following weeks an adjacent house had 
to be moved to the rear of its lot as the sea continued to consume 
the shoreline properties at an alarming rate. 42 
The town's refusal to allow protective construction may have 
amounted to an uncompensated public taking of private property, 
violating the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The af-
fected residents filed a suit seeking ten million dollars in damages 
from the state.43 Because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their 
administrative appeals, and because, in any event, the state would 
not be held responsible for "acts of God," a Massachusetts Superior 
Court judge dismissed the homeowners' suit. 44 
B. South Carolina's Outer Banks 
Born in the Caribbean in mid-September, 1989 as a tropical dis-
turbance, hurricane Hugo intensified to a class four hurricane45 dur-
ing its slow march to the northwest. By September 21 Hugo was 
poised off the South Carolina coast. The National Weather Service 
accurately predicted the midnight landfall46 of one of the most pow-
erful storms to strike the North American continent in this century. 47 
Just before midnight on September 21, the temporarily deserted 
barrier island community of Isle of Palms, South Carolina felt the 
vengeance of Hugo's 135 mile-per-hour winds, and five foot storm 
surge.48 By the time Hugo's destructive force had passed the island 
and roared into Charleston Harbor to descend on the city of Charles-
41 ld. 
42 Howe, Judge Dismisses Suit Filed By Chatham Homeowners, Boston Globe, May 28, 
1988, at 72, col. l. 
43 Fulham, Mass. Sued By Waterfront Homeowners in Chatham, Boston Globe, Jan. 28, 
1988, at 27, col. 6. 
44 Howe, supra note 42, at 72, col. l. 
45 The National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida rates the weakest hurricanes "class 
one" and the strongest "class five." W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 4, at 134. 
46 Parker & Booth, Hugo Rips Through South Carolina, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1989, at 1, 
col. 6. 
47 In this century only the Labor Day storm in 1935 and Hurricane Camille in 1969 have 
been rated class five at the time they made landfall. W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 
4, at 134. Hurricane Hugo had been downgraded from class five to class four at the time it 
struck the South Carolina coast. Nonetheless, as a class four hurricane it was still among the 
most powerful storms to strike the North American continent in the past 100 years. Telephone 
conversation with the National Hurricane Center in Miami, Florida (Jan. 6, 1990). 
48 Parker & Booth, supra note 46, at 1, col. 6. A "storm surge" is a super-elevated mound 
of water that sweeps across the coastline near the area where a hurricane passes or makes 
landfall. S. LEATHERMAN, supra note 11, at 59. 
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ton, a swath of devastation lay in its wake. The following week, 
their return delayed by fears of civil disorder, the 8,000 residents of 
this wealthy year-round coastal community came home to a scene of 
awesome destruction. 49 Hugo demolished as many as twenty percent 
of the island's homes. 50 Flooding heavily damaged others filling them 
with mud and sewage. 51 Few homes were unaffected. 52 
On the Isle of Palms and neighboring Sullivans Island, Hugo's 
mighty wind ripped houses in half. 53 The wind lifted other houses 
from their foundations, carried them yards, and dumped them ca-
priciously on the grounds of neighboring estates. 54 In a few instances 
Hugo obliterated houses entirely, leaving nothing but pieces of heavy 
mechanical equipment to mark the places where they had been. 55 
Fifty miles to the north, the community of Pawleys Island had 
fared little better. On September 27, resident Luke Ellerbe surveyed 
the flattened beach where Hurricane Hugo had flung one of his four 
houses into the other three. 56 The Washington Post reported El-
lerbe's frustration and anger over the fact that South Carolina's 
recently enacted comprehensive coastal-management laws will prob-
ably restrict his ability to rebuild on the property. 57 Passed in 1988, 
the law generally prohibits construction in a so-called "erosion zone" 
encompassing an area from the tide line to twenty feet landward of 
the first coastal sand dune. 58 The law prohibits rebuilding of any 
houses within the zone that are deemed two-thirds destroyed. 59 
The Post reported that Ellerbe depends on rental proceeds from 
his houses to provide substantial retirement income.60 He occupies 
one house and rents the others for as much as $1,250 a week during 
the tourist season.61 Ellerbe purchased the houses in 1948 for 
$15,000. 62 He had them on the market, before Hugo, for $3.5 mil-
49 Schneider, Carolina Isles After Storm: Salvaging the Shattered Past, N. Y. Times, Sept. 







66 Brisbane, Lawsuits in the Wind After Hugo, Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at A3, col. 1. 
67 See id. 
58 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (Law. Co-op. 1976). 
69 Brisbane, supra note 56, at A3, col. 1. 
50 Id. at A3, col. 2. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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lion. 63 Ellerbe plans to remove the demolished house and consider 
building two more where it had stood. 64 His plans, though, may be 
frustrated. While a building inspector has yet to make the deter-
mination, it appears that Ellerbe's property lies in the "erosion zone" 
where rebuilding is to be prohibited. 66 
From Daufuskie Island near the Georgia border, north through 
Hilton Head, St. Helena, Edisto, Sullivans, Isle of Palms, and Paw-
leys, the Outer Banks of South Carolina set the stage for a flood of 
litigation sure to follow Hugo's night visit. Littoral proprietors, 
deprived of the right to rebuild their homes and businesses, will 
bring suit against South Carolina. They will claim that state enforce-
ment of the coastal-management laws would amount to a regulatory 
taking of their property without compensation, in violation of their 
constitutional rights. Littoral proprietors like Luke Ellerbe may be 
expected to mount a vigorous constitutional challenge against the 
new coastal-management laws. 66 
III. THE REASONABLE USE DOCTRINE 
The reasonable use doctrine is a common-law doctrine used to 
settle disputes between landowners who have common interests 
in the control of water.67 Disputes to which the doctrine has 
been applied arise in several different contexts. Originally, the 
doctrine was used to adjudicate suits brought by landowners 
when a neighboring proprietor altered land contours or built 
devices that diverted damaging surface waterS onto the plaintiff's 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
66 Id. (the "erosion zone" is informally referred to as the "dead zone"). 
66 In August, 1989, a property owner on the Isle of Palms, South Carolina, was awarded 
$1.2 million by a state court after he sued the state over the South Carolina Beachfront 
Management Act. The court ruled that the state could not deprive the owner of the right to 
build on the property without paying compensation. South Carolina has appealed the decision, 
and the outcome of the appeal is pending. Applebome, After Hugo, a Storm Over Beach 
Development, N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1989, at AI, col. 3 (national ed.). 
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 comment b (1965); Annotation, Modern 
Status of Rules Governing Interference with Drainage of Surface Waters, 59 A.L.R.2D 421, 
434 (1958); . 
68 One court defined "surface water" as follows: 
Surface water means the water from rains, springs, or melting snows which lies or 
flows on the surface of the earth but does not form part of a well-defined body of 
water or a natural watercourse. It does not lose its character as surface water merely 
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land. 69 The doctrine also has been applied to resolve complaints 
engendered when a littoral proprietor erects a protective structure, 
causing accelerated damage to a neighboring beach-front parcel. 70 
Finally, in some parts of the country, the doctrine is fundamental in 
allocating water use rights among competing riparian proprietors. 71 
Grounded in the tort law of nuisance, 72 the reasonable use doctrine 
is inherently flexible. 73 It requires balancing a proprietor's interest 
in a particular use of property against the consequences of that use 
to neighbors and the surrounding community.74 When the utility to 
a proprietor of an anticipated use outweighs its detriment to the 
community, the reasonable use doctrine establishes the proprietor's 
right to that use. 75 If a proprietor's anticipated use amounts to a 
public nuisance, however, the doctrine will prohibit it. 76 
As with any pliant legal construct, the reasonable use doctrine 
gains its flexibility at the cost of simplicity. Effective application of 
the doctrine requires a complex calculus to balance competing rights 
and interests. The following are among the factors considered in 
determining whether or not a use is reasonable: 
(1) whether the defendant has secured a license for the use and 
whether the licensing conditions have been met; 
(2) the purpose of the defendant's use; 
(3) the suitability of the use to the watercourse; 
because some of it may be absorbed by or soaked into the marshy or boggy ground 
where it collects. 
Butler v. Bruno, 115 R.I. 264, 267, 341 A.2d 735, 737 (1975) (citing Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 
Minn. 163, 167,32 N.W.2d 286,288-89 (1948». 
69 See, e.g., Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 577 (1862) ("Any interference by 
one land-owner with the natural drainage, injurious to the land of another, and not reasonable, 
is unjustifiable. "). 
70 See Lummis v. Lilly, 385 Mass. 41, 46, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (1984) ("There is no sound 
reason for imposing the obligation of reasonable use on riparian owners, while permitting 
littoral owners to use their property without any limitations. "). 
71 See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 3 Ill. 492 (1842). "Each riparian proprietor is bound 
to make such a use of running water as to do as little injury to those below him as is consistent 
with a valuable benefit to himself. The use must be a reasonable one." Id. at 495. 
72 Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 216, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796 (1977). 
'13 Id. 
74 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1965). 
75 Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 216, 236 S.E.2d at 797; see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 86-87 (1851), cited in Lummis v. Lilly, 385 Mass. 41, 45, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 
1149 (1982). 
76 Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 216, 236 S.E.2d at 796. In Pendergmst the North Carolina 
Supreme Court adopted the reasonable use rule recognizing that the rule imposes liability 
when harmful interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable and causes substan-
tial damage. The court Iurther recognized that, analytically, a cause of action for unreasonable 
interference with the flow of surface water is a private nuisance action. Id. 
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(4) the economic value of the use; 
(5) the social value of the use; 
(6) the amount and extent of harm the use causes; 
[Vol. 18:125 
(7) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use or 
method of use of one owner or the other; 
(8) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by 
each owner; 
(9) the protection of existing values of water uses, land, invest-
ment, and enterprise; and, 
(10) the justice of requiring the user who is causing harm to bear 
the 10ss.77 
Obviously, not all of these factors are relevant in every context. 
Nonetheless, from state to state, and regardless of context, the 
determining factors have remained substantially consistent. 78 Eval-
uating the relevant factors in light of the circumstances of a partic-
ular case involves a factual determination. For that reason, the 
evaluation is a task for the jury or other trier of fact. 79 
The reasonable use doctrine can be useful in analyzing littoral 
takings claims because if an anticipated use is unreasonable by the 
doctrine's standards, then prohibition of the use as a nuisance pres-
ents no constitutional issue. Conversely, if the anticipated use is 
reasonable, a strong presumption exists that a landowner has a right 
to the use. 80 Statutory prohibition of a reasonable use presents the 
elements of an interesting takings suit. Thus, the reasonable use 
doctrine can be used as an initial test of the viability of a potential 
77 See Lummis v. Lilly, 385 Mass. 41, 46, 429 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (1984); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1965). 
78 See, e.g., Lummis, 385 Mass. at 46-47, 429 N.E.2d at 1150. Factors that bear on the 
reasonableness of a particular use of water include: whether the defendant secured a license 
for the use; whether the defendant met the conditions of the license; the purpose of the 
defendant's use; the suitability of the use to the watercourse; the economic value of the use; 
the extent and amount of harm caused by the use; the practicality of avoiding the harm by 
adjusting the quantity of water used by each owner; the protection of the existing values of 
water uses, land, investments, and enterprise; and the justice of requiring the owner causing 
the harm to bear the loss. [d.; see also Enderson v. Kelehan, 226 Minn. 163,168,32 N.W.2d 
286, 289 (1948). Property owners act reasonably with regard to surface water drainage if 
there is necessity for such drainage; if care is taken to avoid harming the land receiving the 
drained water; if the benefit to the land drained outweighs the gravity of harm to the land 
receiving the drainage; and if, where feasible, drainage is accomplished by improving the 
natural drainage system. [d.; Pendergrast, 293 N.C. at 217,236 S.E.2d at 797. Determining 
reasonableness of use involves considering the extent and character of the harm to plaintiff; 
the social value the law attaches to the type of use that is invaded; the suitability of the use 
to the locality; and the burden on the plaintiff to minimize the harm. [d. 
79 Annotation, supra note 67, at 435. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A comment 
a (1965); Lummis, 385 Mass. at 46,429 N.E.2d at 1149-50. 
80 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
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takings action. Only when an anticipated use is reasonable can a 
landowner mount a takings suit with any likelihood of success. 
IV. TAKINGS ISSUES 
The federal government, the state governments, and municipal 
governments through the states, have the power to regulate private 
property use in order to advance legitimate governmental inter-
ests.81 The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, how-
ever, prohibits the federal government from taking private property 
for public use without compensating the owner.82 The fourteenth 
amendment extends the taking prohibition to the states.83 When 
regulation of private property use becomes so burdensome as to 
amount to a taking, the law requires the regulator to compensate 
the owner for the value of the property taken. 84 
A. The Basic Elements of a Takings Cause of Action 
There are two essential elements to a takings cause of action. The 
plaintiff must have an interest in property, and the government, or 
an agent of the government, must interfere with that interest. With-
out these two elements, no cause of action exists and no takings suit 
will succeed. 
For the purpose of takings jurisprudence, the term "property" is 
construed to include both tangible property and intangible property 
rights.85 The term encompasses the full array of rights inherent in 
an individual's relationship to a physical or legal entity.86 Govern-
mental interference can range from mild regulation of peripheral 
property rights to outright physical occupation of land. 87 
81 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
82 The fifth amendment reads in part: "[Njor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 
at 415. 
sa The fourteenth amendment reads in part: "[Njor shall any State deprive any person of 
... property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (holding in part 
that the fourteenth amendment extends the prohibition against uncompensated public taking 
of private property to the states). 
84 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415. 
85 See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. 226 (Court recognized takings 
cause of action when municipality allegedly infringed corporate property rights by building 
street across railroad right-of-way); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1979) (Court 
recognized takings cause of action when federal law infringed antiquities dealer's property 
rights by prohibiting sale of certain Native American artifacts). 
86 United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1944). 
87 See id. 
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Establishing the elements of a takings cause of action is relatively 
easy when claims involve governmental appropriations or invasion 
of real or personal property. The Supreme Court has recognized 
causes of action where a municipality built a street across a railroad 
right-of-way,88 where a municipal ordinance required landlords to 
permit the installation of an electronic device on tenement rooftops,89 
and where military airplanes persistently violated private airspace. 90 
Establishing a cause of action is slightly harder when claims in-
volve regulation of intangible property rights. Nonetheless, courts 
readily recognize takings conflicts when government regulates any 
nontrivial property interest to a proprietor's detriment. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has recognized causes of action in suits 
alleging infringement of such intangible property interests as the 
right to alter an individual historic landmark,91 the right to develop 
real estate for industrial use,92 and the right to offer goods for sale.93 
B. The Two Avenues of Takings Jurisprudence 
Viewed broadly, there are two ways to win a takings suit. 94 The 
first is to prove that a regulatory statute or ordinance serves no 
legitimate public purpose. 95 This avenue of takings jurisprudence has 
been termed the "poison-purpose" approach.96 The poison-purpose 
approach usually will be ineffective when coastal-management reg-
ulations foreclose a littoral proprietor's right to construct defensive 
barriers or rebuild a damaged or demolished structure. The purposes 
BB See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 230. 
89 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (taking 
found when New York statute required landlords to allow installation of cable television device 
on tenement rooftops). 
00 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258 (1945) (taking found when frequent 
overflights by military aircraft prevented continuing use of property as poultry farm). 
91 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (no taking found 
when New York City historic preservation ordinance foreclosed planned construction of office 
tower atop Grand Central Station). 
92 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-85 (1926) (no taking found 
when zoning ordinance prohibited development of property for industrial use). 
93 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979) (no taking found when federal law prohibited 
sale of certain Native American artifacts held as inventory by antiquities dealer). 
94 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (no taking found when "open-
space" zoning ordinance limited number of houses developer was permitted to build). 
96 Agins, 477 U.S. at 260; see also Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). 
96 Plater, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and 
Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 661, 708 (1989). 
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of coastal-management regulations include protecting human life, 
avoiding rescue costs, avoiding the costs of building and maintaining 
protective structures, protecting coastal wetlands, and preserving 
the aesthetic quality of the seacoast. 97 
There is no doubt that specific instances of coastal-management 
regulations with illegitimate purposes exist.98 Generally, however, 
the regulations serve to further legitimate governmental interests. 
Further, the judiciary customarily defers to the legislature when 
questions of legislative purpose are at issue.99 For these reasons 
littoral proprietors will find it difficult to win takings suits by arguing 
that coastal-management regulations serve no legitimate public pur-
pose. 
The second way to prevail in a takings suit is to demonstrate that 
even if a regulation serves a legitimate governmental purpose, it 
burdens a private property interest so heavily that the regulation 
amounts to a taking. 1OO This avenue of takings jurisprudence is re-
ferred to as the "excessive burden" approach in this Comment. 
Proprietors utilizing the excessive burden approach argue that reg-
ulation is so burdensome that it amounts to an act of eminent domain, 
and as such must be compensated. 101 
97 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 480-A (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-270 
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (editor's note); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.21 (1950); Chatham, Mass., 
Wetlands Protection Regulations § 1.01(2) (Oct. 29, 1986). 
98 NoHan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), is a much-cited example 
of a recent Supreme Court decision that rested on one permutation of the "poison-purpose" 
reasoning. The Court found that the California Coastal Commission's imposition of an access 
easement requirement on appellant's rebuilding permit did not serve to further the purposes 
of the permit requirement and therefore amounted to a violation of appellant's rights under 
the takings clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. [d. at 837. 
99 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
The ... law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for 
the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the 
. . . requirement . . . . It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and 
that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way 
to correct it. 
[d. at 487-88. 
100 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922) (statute forbidding mining 
of coal so as to cause subsidence of, and damage to, surface structures found excessively 
burdensome to coal operator's previously existing contract and property rights). 
101 [d. at 413. Eminent domain is the power to take private property for public use by the 
state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of 
a public character. The right of eminent domain is the right of the state to reassert, either 
temporarily or permanently, its domain over any portion of the soil of the state on account of 
public exigency and for the public good. Thus, in time of war or insurrection, the proper 
authorities may possess and hold any part of the territory of the state for the common safety; 
and in time of peace the legislature may authorize the appropriation of the same to public 
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There is no set formula for determining when a regulation becomes 
so burdensome as to effect a taking. 102 The result of a takings analysis 
based on excessive burden depends largely on the circumstances of 
the particular case under consideration. 103 The Supreme Court has 
recognized the ad hoc aspect of the excessive burden approach to 
takings jurisprudence. 104 In spite of its ambiguity, plaintiffs in littoral 
takings suits most likely will utilize the excessive burden approach 
because the poison-purpose approach to a littoral takings claim is 
likely to prove a dead end. The remainder of this section provides 
an analytic structure that resolves some of that ambiguity. 
c. A Way to Think About Excessive Burden Analysis 
Given the ad hoc nature of takings jurisprudence generally, it is 
not surprising that there are nearly as many approaches to analyzing 
takings claims based on excessive burden as there have been cases 
alleging it. One way to bring a degree of order to the amorphous 
body of case law on the subject is to think of any governmental 
infringement of private property rights as a taking. 105 Having taken 
private property for public purposes, the Constitution imposes an 
obligation on the government to compensate the owner for the value 
of the property. 106 
The government can escape its obligation to pay compensation 
under either of two circumstances. When a prohibited use amounts 
to a public nuisance, the government need not compensate for pro-
hibiting the use.107 The government can prevent a proprietor from 
using property in a way that causes affirmative harm without incur-
ring an obligation to compensate. Recall that in suits between private 
purposes, such as the opening of roads, construction of defenses, or providing channels for 
trade or travel. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470 (5th ed. 1979). 
102 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1961). 
103 United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("Traditionally, 
we have treated the issue as to whether a particular governmental restriction amounted to a 
constitutional taking as being a question properly turning upon the particular circumstances 
of each case. "). 
104 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (the burden imposed by regulation "is a question 
of degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions"). 
105 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (citing two exceptions to the general rule that governmental destruction of private 
property constitutes a compensable taking). 
106 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
107 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 144 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887»; see also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
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individuals a land use that amounts to a nuisance will fail to satisfy 
the requirements of the reasonable use doctrine. The reasonable use 
doctrine does not recognize any right on the part of a proprietor to 
use land in a manner that creates a nuisance. Similarly the common 
law recognizes the government's right to prevent a private land-
owner from using property in any way that would create a nuisance. 
Unreasonable, nuisance-creating uses of land fail a critical threshold 
test. The government can prohibit such uses without incurring any 
obligation to compensate the proprietor. 
The government can also avoid compensating owners for the value 
of property taken if the proprietors derive sufficient benefit from a 
regulation to offset its costS.108 Proprietors may benefit in various 
ways from the general effects or specific provisions of a regulatory 
statute or ordinance. 109 If these "reciprocal benefits" are sufficient 
to offset the costs that the regulation imposes on the affected pro-
prietors, then further compensation is not required,uo Unlike the 
nuisance exception, the presence of adequate reciprocal benefit is 
not an exception to the government's obligation to compensate when 
it takes private property for public purposes. Rather, reciprocal 
benefit analysis recognizes that the required compensation need not 
take the form of a settlement check issued by the government to 
proprietors. 
1. A Threshold Test: Nuisance or Reasonable Use? 
In jurisdictions that rely on the reasonable use doctrine to adju-
dicate disputes over the control of water, owners who make unrea-
sonable use of property are liable to parties injured by the use. III In 
a civil action, an injunction prohibiting the unreasonable use will 
issue in favor of the injured party. The offending party also will be 
required to pay for the injured party's damages. When a use is 
reasonable, however, the reasonable use doctrine establishes an own-
er's right to the use. 1l2 Anyone wishing to foreclose a proprietor's 
reasonable use will be obliged to pay the owner to forego the use; 
108 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania Coal 
260 U.S. at 415). 
109 See infra notes 180-188 and accompanying text. 
lIO Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Pennsylvania 
Coal, 260 U.S. at 415). 
III Pendergrast v. Aiken, 293 N.C. 201, 216, 236 S.E.2d 787, 796; Commonwealth v. Alger, 
61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 86-87 (1851), cited in Lummis v. Lilly, 385 Mass. 41, 45, 429 N.E.2d 
1146, 1149 (1982). 
lI2 [d. 
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they will have to purchase the owner's right to use the property 
reasonably. 
The nuisance exception to the prohibition against uncompensated 
takings is a direct analogue to the reasonable use rule in the realm 
of public law. When governmental regulation interferes with a rea-
sonable use of property, the government is obliged to pay the owner 
to forego the use. 113 When a prohibited use amounts to a public 
nuisance, however, the government can prohibit the use without 
providing compensation. 114 Thus, if a plaintiff's excessive burden 
takings suit is to succeed, the plaintiff must first prove that the use 
foreclosed by regulation is a reasonable use, not a public nuisance. 
Defining nuisance, then, becomes a primary task. At the outset, 
it is important to recognize and reject an obvious, but tautological, 
possibility. In defending takings suits, advocates for the regulator 
may be tempted to define any use of property that violates a statute 
or ordinance authorized by a legitimate public purpose as a nuisance. 
Violating any governmental act that survives the "poison-purpose" 
test would be, by this definition, a nuisance. Any such use could be 
prohibited without compensation. 
At least one Supreme Court Justice has explicitly recognized the 
illegitimacy of this circular definition.115 Justice Rehnquist rejected 
the tautology and reached a broader definition: when a prohibited 
use is dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of the community, 
the use amounts to a public nuisance. 116 Courts that find such affir-
mative danger will not require the regulator to compensate even if 
diminution in value to the proprietor is extreme. 117 
Takings cases decided in favor of the regulator on the grounds 
that a regulated use was a public nuisance fall into two general 
classes. In the first are cases in which proprietors deliberately de-
voted their property to uses considered directly inimical to the health 
or morals of the public. lIS In Mugler v. Kansas,119 for example, a 
liS See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
114 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887); see also Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 413, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
115 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 145 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
116 [d. 
117 See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 682 (1887) (because oleo margarine 
found to be an "impure food product," no compensation required when Pennsylvania pure food 
statute rendered manufacturing plant commercially useless); see infra notes 119-21 and ac-
companying text. 
118 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624 (1887) (alcoholic beverages); Powell, 127 U.S. 
at 678 (impure food product). 
119 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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brewer brought an unsuccessful takings suit against the state of 
Kansas when the state enforced a prohibition on the manufacture 
and sale of alcoholic beverages to close down the brewer's busi-
ness. 120 The Supreme Court declined to require the state to compen-
sate owners for losses sustained "by reason of their not being per-
mitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury on the 
community. "121 
Cases in which normally accepted activities are prohibited because 
they are inappropriate in particular settings constitute a second class 
of nuisance cases. l22 These cases commonly arise in disputes about 
zoning, where residential areas have grown up around previously 
existing industrial uses. l23 The "second-class" nuisance cases are 
characterized by hazards incident to normally accepted uses that 
impose danger on the health or material well-being of the community. 
In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 124 for example, a town exercised 
its police power to pass an ordinance that required a proprietor to 
close an open, water-filled gravel quarry that attracted neighborhood 
children. l25 The Supreme Court recognized a presumption that any 
exercise of the police power is reasonable unless the plaintiff proves 
otherwise. 126 Because the proprietor had failed to introduce any 
evidence tending to prove that using the property as a gravel quarry 
did not create a nuisance, the Court declined to require the town to 
compensate the quarry owner. 127 
In this second class of nuisance cases, as long as the proprietor is 
not denied all economic benefit from the property, the regulator is 
not required to provide compensation. l28 This holds true even when 
regulations foreclose the most profitable use of the property. 129 The-
oretically, if a regulation extinguishes all economic benefit, courts 
will require some compensation. 130 The case law indicates, however, 
120 Id. at 654--55. 
121 Id. at 669. 
122 See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text. 
123 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1961) (no taking when previ-
ously existing gravel quarry closed down because of danger to suburban residents); Hadachek 
v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (no taking when previously existing brickyard closed down 
as source of irritants to suburban community). 
124 369 U.S. 590 (1961). 
125 Id. at 595. 
126 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1958) (state exercises of police power 
presumed valid when challenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). 
127 Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 595. 
128 Id. at 592; see also Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 412 (1915). 
129 Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592. 
ISO Hadachek, 239 U.S. at 418. 
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that courts have relied on rather improbable findings of remaining 
value to deny compensation to affected proprietors. 131 
A third class of cases aids in defining the parameters of the nuis-
ance exception. Cases in which generally acceptable uses of property 
are prohibited in order to enhance or affirmatively benefit the public 
health and welfare are distinct from nuisance cases. It may be dif-
ficult to determine where the line between nuisance and enhance-
ment lies. Nonetheless, as with most legal questions of degree, some 
cases clearly fall on the enhancement side of the line. Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City is an enhancement example. 132 
In that case, the Supreme Court recognized that an ordinance pro-
hibiting construction of an office tower atop a historically significant 
mid-Manhattan building was designed to promote the general wel-
fare. 133 It is reasonable to infer from that finding that the Court did 
not consider the proposed use a nuisance. Indeed, in his dissent to 
Penn Central, Justice Rehnquist made this inference explicit by 
characterizing the ordinance as one designed not to prohibit a nuis-
ance, but to affirmatively enhance public welfare. l34 
The fact that a prohibited use is reasonable, and thus does not 
represent a nuisance, does not resolve the issue of whether the 
regulator is obligated to pay compensation to the affected proprietor. 
Rather, the nuisance test is a threshold inquiry. 135 When a prohibited 
use is determined to be a nuisance, further takings analysis becomes 
unnecessary. If a prohibited use is found reasonable, however, the 
plaintiff's claim for compensation requires further analysis. The net 
131 See, e.g., Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (lacking evidence to contrary, court concludes that 
value remains in gravel mine closed by municipal ordinance); Hadachek, 239 U.S. at 412 (court 
finds value remaining in regulated brickyard because brick clay can be removed to alternate 
location for manufacture into bricks). 
132 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (prohibiting con-
struction of office tower atop historically significant mid-Manhattan building); Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (zoning restriction excludes business and industrial use); 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (zoning restriction prohibits 
industrial use). 
133 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. In Penn Central the Court concluded that New York 
City's historic preservation ordinance did not work a taking under the circumstances of the 
case. The Court reached its conclusion not because the proposed alteration would have created 
a nuisance, but because the ordinance permitted continued beneficial use of the site, and 
afforded the appellant valuable development opportunities at other sites. Id. at 138. 
134 See id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
135 See id. at 144-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist recognized that the 
government need not compensate a proprietor when it prohibits a use that amounts to a public 
nuisance. Thus, a finding in a takings case that a prohibited use is a nuisance is tantamount 
to a decision favoring the regulator. Therefore, determining whether or not a prohibited use 
is a nuisance becomes a critical threshold in takings analysis. Id. 
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cost of regulation to the property owner becomes the single remain-
ing inquiry. 136 
2. Net Cost Analysis 
An anticipated use that survives the nuisance threshold test is a 
reasonable use. 137 When governmental regulation prohibits a reason-
able use, the affected proprietor is entitled to compensation. 138 Com-
pensation can take one of two forms. The government may compen-
sate the owner in money for the value of the property taken. 
Alternatively the general effects or specific provisions of the regu-
latory statute or ordinance may adequately compensate the owner's 
loss. 139 
The purpose of net cost analysis is to determine whether, in a 
given instance, the benefits accruing to a proprietor through regu-
lation adequately offset the costs the regulations impose on the 
proprietor. 140 The inquiry is essentially a costlbenefit analysis in 
which a number of different factors contribute to determining the 
values on each side of the equation. 141 
The first part of the analysis involves a number of factors that 
contribute to the overall cost of regulation. The immediate economic 
cost142 of governmental action or regulation represents the sum of 
three separate factors: the value of property lost or destroyed, 143 
diminution in the value of property,144 and the value of lost oppor-
tunity.145 When the state physically appropriates property, the 
owner loses all of its value. This kind of appropriation is typical when 
the government takes property by eminent domain in order to facil-
itate public works. Property destruction also may result from gov-
ernmental invasions that fall short of appropriation. For example, 
when repeated overflights of military aircraft cause livestock to panic 
136 [d. at 147. 
137 See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
138 See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
139 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147--50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
140 See id. at 147. 
141 See infra notes 143-77 and accompanying text. 
142 The author apologizes for the imprecision of the term "immediate economic costs" in a 
context in which all the relevant costs are economic. The term is meant to designate those 
costs that are readily quantifiable and result in an immediate change in the financial position 
of the person subject to regulation. 
143 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1945). 
144 Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915). 
145 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 117 (1978). 
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and die, the owner loses the value of the livestock,146 The value of 
property lost through state appropriation, or destroyed as a result 
of invasive state action, is one factor that contributes to immediate 
economic cost. 
A second factor determining immediate economic cost is diminu-
tion in the value of property due to governmental action or regula-
tion. 147 The Supreme Court has considered cases in which the im-
portance of diminution costs varied greatly. For example, when a 
municipality built a public street across a railroad right-of-way, di-
minution in the value of the plaintiff's property was very slight. 148 
On the other hand, when a federal law prohibited the sale of certain 
Native American artifacts, diminution amounted to almost the whole 
value of the inventory belonging to a dealer in such antiquities. 149 
Finally, the value of lost opportunity is properly included in as-
sessing the immediate economic cost of governmental actions and 
regulations. 15o For example, when regulation prevents a developer 
from building rental property, the value of existing or reasonably 
ascertainable leases represents an opportunity cost of the prohibition 
to the developer. 151 
Pinpointing the cost of lost opportunity is complicated by the diffi-
culty of finding a rational cut-off point for such costs. 
When regulation prevents the "best" or "most profitable" use of 
property, the courts will weigh that fact as a factor in cost assess-
ment. 152 It is not clear, however, that the factor has significant 
independent effect on the decisions in takings cases. In those cases 
involving substantial reasons for the court to find for the plaintiff, a 
finding that governmental action interfered with the best use tele-
graphs a decision in the plaintiff's favor. 153 When the court has 
independent reasons for finding no compensable taking, however, 
146 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1945). 
147 See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) 
(basis of suit is claimed diminution in value of railroad property after municipality constructed 
road across right-of-way); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 (1979) (basis of suit is claimed 
diminution in value of inventory belonging to dealer in antiquities when federal law prohibits 
sale of certain Native American artifacts). 
148 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R., 166 U.S. at 241 (municipality constructed public 
street across railroad right-of-way). 
149 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 54 (1979) (antiquities dealer prohibited from offering 
certain Native American artifacts for sale). 
160 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1978). 
151 See id. 
152 E.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 120; 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1945). 
153 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (chronic invasion of private airspace found a compensable 
taking). 
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the fact that regulation prohibits best use has little offsetting influ-
ence. 154 
The court's ambivalence about denial of best use may be attribut-
able to the fact that "best use" has no independent meaning. When 
"best use" means "most profitable use," the analysis logically is 
subsumed under consideration of the immediate economic costs of 
lost opportunity.155 When factors other than loss of potential profits 
come into play, it may make sense to consider denial of best use as 
part of the cost of prohibiting an existing use or a primary expec-
tation about future use. 156 
Foreclosure of an existing use,157 or a primary investment-backed 
expectation about future use,158 by governmental action or regulation 
is a factor that disposes the courts to look favorably on a plaintiff's 
taking claim. 159 The courts have considered this fador in many tak-
ings cases, and while it is influential, it is not dispositive of the 
takings claim. 160 In fact, the influence of this factor may be greatest 
in reverse. A finding that regulation does not interfere with present 
use telegraphs a decision favoring the regulator. 161 Similarly, when 
regulations do not interfere with primary investment-backed expec-
tations, courts are unlikely to find a compensable taking. 162 
An established tenet of takings analysis is that extinguishing a 
"single strand" in a "full bundle" of property rights does not, in 
itself, amount to a compensable taking.163 Courts are disposed to 
find in favor of proprietors, however, if regulation leaves property 
with no remaining economically viable use. 164 The court's rationale 
is that when no economically viable use remains, the regulation is 
tantamount to a physical appropriation. 165 
164 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 120. 
165 See supra notes 150-152 and accompanying text. 
156 See infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text. 
157 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 256 (repeated overflights of military aircraft prevent continuing 
use of property as poultry farm). 
158 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987). 
159 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470; Causby, 328 U.S. at 256. 
160 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (no taking 
when historic preservation ordinance forecloses anticipated construction of office tower atop 
Grand Central Station); see supra note 123. 
161 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136. 
162 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485. 
163 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); see also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470 (statute 
foreclosed right to mine certain coal); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 (ordinance foreclosed 
right to develop air space). 
164 Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 411 (1915) (citing Ex parte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609, 
82 P. 241, (1905». 
165 See Keystone, 480 U.S at 516 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Our decisions establish that 
governmental action short of any physical invasion may constitute a taking because such 
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Allocation of risk is the final factor in assessing the cost that 
regulation imposes on proprietors. 166 In Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,167 coal proprietors purchased the so-called 
"support estate" from surface landowners.l68 Controlling this inter-
est enabled the coal proprietors to mine without regard for surface 
damage resulting from subsidence. 169 In effect, mine owners pur-
chased the right to expose surface proprietors to the risk of damage 
incident to subsidence. Assuming a willing seller and buyer in a 
voluntary exchange, the economic value of the risk was reflected 
accurately in the purchase price of the support estate. 
When the Pennsylvania Subsidence Act foreclosed the mine own-
er's rights to extract coal without regard to subsidence damage, the 
value they had exchanged for that right was lost to them. In Key-
stone Bituminous, the Supreme Court recognized this cost, but did 
not find it compelling. 170 Regulated proprietors fared better in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. l7l Justice Holmes concluded his analysis 
of that case by recognizing the injustice of depriving the coal oper-
ators of the value they had exchanged in order to insulate themselves 
from subsidence risk. 172 Even in dissent, Justice Brandeis recognized 
the costs that risk reallocation imposed on the plaintiffs.173 Justice 
Brandeis would have invoked the nuisance exception to the taking 
prohibition, however, to uphold the regulatory act in spite of risk 
costs to the coal companies. 174 
The risk factor will not always be explicit, as it was in the cases 
just discussed. Implicit risk factors are frequently overlooked in 
takings analysis. For example, in Hadachek v. Sebastian,175 there 
was no intimation that suburban home buyers were unaware of the 
presence of an operating brickyard in the vicinity of their houses. 176 
regulatory action might result in 'as complete [a loss] as if the [government] had entered upon 
the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.''') (quoting United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946)) ; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) 
("To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect 
for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it."). 
166 See infra notes 167-177 and accompanying text. 
167 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
168 [d. at 478. 
169 [d. at 478. 
170 See Keystone, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
171 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
172 [d. at 416. 
173 See id. at 417. 
17. [d. 
176 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
176 See id. 
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Presumably, the buyers paid a lower purchase price for their prop-
erty in recognition of this unsavory neighbor. When regulation closed 
the brick kilns, the brick company essentially absorbed the cost of 
these negative premiums. The Court's analysis never considered this 
cost, perhaps because the nuisance exception rendered it moot. 177 
Nonetheless, H adachek presents an example of the cost that implicit 
risk reallocation may impose on a proprietor affected by governmen-
tal regulation. 
Immediate economic costs and the costs associated with prevent-
ing best use, foreclosing existing uses, extinguishing discreet prop-
erty rights, and reallocating risk represent the total cost of govern-
mental regulation to affected proprietors.178 Assuming that an 
anticipated use is reasonable, and has therefore survived the nuis-
ance threshold test, the government will be obligated to compensate 
affected proprietors in an amount equal to the total cost imposed on 
them by regulation. 179 When proprietors realize some benefit from 
regulation along with the costs imposed, however, the government's 
obligation to compensate is reduced by an amount equivalent to the 
value of those benefits. 180 
Generally, two types of benefits are possible. A regulatory ordi-
nance or statute may include specific provisions designed to help 
offset the costs of regulation. 181 In Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City,182 for example, a historic preservation ordinance 
contained provisions allowing owners of historic buildings to transfer 
development rights to other area properties. l83 These transferable 
development rights had quantifiable economic value, which the Court 
177 See id. (municipal ordinance forcing closure of previously existing brickyard held not a 
taking because use amounted to public nuisance). 
178 The factors are not always clearly delineated in the caselaw. Nonetheless, an examination 
of the leading takings cases supports this point. 
179 See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text. 
180 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
Even where the government prohibits a non-injurious use, the Court has ruled that 
a taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of 
land and thereby "secure[sl an average reciprocity of advantage." Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. It is for this reason that zoning does not constitute 
a 'taking.' While zoning at times reduces individual property values . . . it is 
reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect 
of the zoning will be benefited by another. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
181 See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text. 
182 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
183 See id. 
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set off against the cost to the developer of the restrictions the law 
imposed on its historic site. l84 
An ordinance or statute may also benefit a property owner indi-
rectly as a member of the community affected by regulation. l85 In 
assessing the value of indirect benefits, courts must consider how 
diffuse the benefits of a regulation are, and thus, how meaningful to 
any given individual. For example, closing down a brick kiln may 
have a salutary effect on the atmosphere as a whole, but individuals 
living immediately downwind experience a significant improvement 
in the quality of their lives. 
The benefits of historic preservation186 or density restrictions187 
are widely distributed throughout the community. The owner of 
several major area hotels, however, is in a position to reap special 
benefit from a setting of particular architectural and historical inter-
est. Presumably, people will be attracted to hotels in such areas. 
Similarly, a residential developer is well situated to profit from 
density restrictions that render neighborhoods more desirable and 
drive prices up. These are situations in which regulated proprietors 
are in a unique position that enables them to recapture significant 
gain from otherwise diffuse benefits. It is only by retaining substan-
tial economic interests in the regulated areas, however, that these 
proprietors reap greater benefits than the community at large. 
Some regulations benefit a much narrower community than those 
just discussed. An example is when a mine safety regulation requires 
leaving a wall of coal at the mine perimeter to guard against flood-
ing. l88 This industrial safety regulation has significant economic cost. 
It also produces measurable benefit in the form of fewer mine disas-
ters. In this example, the regulated proprietor is also the sole ben-
eficiary of the regulation. The regulation amounts to a requirement 
that the proprietor purchase the safety advantage the regulation is 
designed to produce. The proprietor is "paying" exactly what the 
safety advantages "cost;" reciprocal benefits that precisely offset 
costs are inherent in this type of regulation. Affected proprietors 
will have weak takings claims indeed. 
184 Id. at 137. 
185 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 262 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134-35. 
186 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 (community benefits of historic preservation include 
fostering civic pride, protecting and enhancing city's attraction to tourists, stimulating busi-
ness and industry, and promoting use of historic sites for education and pleasure). 
187 See Agins, 477 U.S. at 255 (zoning plan benefits appellant as well as public by assuring 
careful, orderly development and provision for open-space areas). 
188 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 533 (1914). 
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In sum, any form of reciprocal benefit may help offset the costs a 
regulation imposes on proprietors, thus weakening proprietor's tak-
ings claims. Benefits may take the form of statutory provisions 
conferring specific advantages on proprietors affected by regulation. 
Alternatively, regulated proprietors may be in a position to realize 
particular advantages from the effects of regulations designed to 
benefit the community at large. 
To this point we have determined that in order to establish a 
takings cause of action a plaintiff must have an interest in property 
and the government, or an agent of the government, must interfere 
with that interest. Having established a cause of action, takings 
plaintiffs can proceed in two ways. The plaintiff can attempt to prove 
that regulation serves no legitimate public purpose. In the alterna-
tive, the plaintiff can try to show that regulation is so burdensome 
that it amounts to an act of eminent domain and, as such, must be 
compensated. In most instances, plaintiffs in littoral takings suits 
will rely on the excessive burden approach because the poison-pur-
pose, route is likely to prove unproductive. 
The suggested approach to excessive burden analysis assumes that 
any governmental infringement of private property rights is a taking 
which the government is obligated to compensate. There are two 
circumstances, however, under which the government can escape its 
obligation to compensate. The government need not compensate 
proprietors for prohibiting uses of property that amount to public 
nuisances. Even when the government prohibits reasonable antici-
pated uses, however, it need not pay compensation if ,the general 
effects or specific provisions of a regulation adequately compensate 
the regulated proprietor's losses. The dual objects of excessive bur-
den takings jurisprudence, then, are to determine whether a prohib-
ited use constitutes a public nuisance, and if it does not, to determine 
whether adequate compensation for regulatory loss inheres in the 
effect or provisions of the regulation. 
V. Do OR DIE: ELEMENTS IN THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF A 
LITTORAL TAKINGS SUIT 
Thus far, this Comment has established that plaintiffs pressing a 
littoral takings claim based on excessive burden face three essential 
tasks: they must demonstrate the existence of facts sufficient to 
establish a colorable cause of action, they must prove that their 
anticipated use does not amount to a public nuisance, and they must 
show that the net cost of regulation imposes an excessive burden on 
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their interests. This section shows how the elements identified as 
necessary to these proofs play out in the factual context of typical 
littoral takings claims. 
A. Establishing a Takings Cause of Action 
The first step in analyzing a littoral takings claim is to determine 
whether a colorable cause of action exists. The plaintiff has the 
burden of putting forth facts that, if true, establish the elements of 
a takings suit. 189 Thus, the plaintiff must show that a governmental 
act infringes a private property interest that the plaintiff holds. 190 
It is not difficult to put forth sufficient factual allegations to es-
tablish a colorable takings cause of action either when coastal-man-
agement laws prohibit rebuilding private homes destroyed by hur-
ricanes, or when regulations prohibit littoral proprietors from 
constructing erosion barriers. An unregulated fee simple owner has 
the right to use the land for residential purposes and to take nec-
essary steps to protect that land from natural hazards. Governmental 
regulations that prohibit exercise of these private property interests 
create the necessary elements of a takings conflict. 
After establishing a cause of action, a plaintiff's attorney would 
examine the regulatory ordinance or statute. If it contained an in-
dication of questionable governmental pUlpose, the plaintiff's attor-
ney would mount a "poison-purpose" argument. 191 A successful ar-
gument would establish that a regulatory act bore no rational 
relationship to furthering any legitimate governmental purpose. At 
the plaintiff's request, an injunction would issue barring enforce-
ment of the act. 192 The court also might award damages for costs 
incurred during the time the regulation was enforced. 193 
This Comment suggests, however, that littoral takings plaintiffs 
are not likely to succeed by pressing a "poison-purpose" argument. 194 
Thus, the outcome of most littoral takings suits will turn on three 
189 In this respect, takings claims are like other civil actions. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 
(order for summary judgment shall issue if filings, taken together, show there is no issue as 
to any material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 
190 The language of the fifth and fourteenth amendments makes it clear that there must be 
a public taking of private property for a takings conflict to arise. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
191 See Plater, supra note 96, at 661. 
192 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255, 259 (1980). 
193 See LaRusso, "Paying for the Change": First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of 
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles and the Calculation of Interim Damages for Regulatory 
Takings, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 551 (1990). 
194 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
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issues: first, the plaintiff must prove that a prohibited use is not a 
nuisance; second, the plaintiff must show that under the circum-
stances, regulation is excessively burdensome; finally, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate the absence of reciprocal benefit adequate to offset 
the costs the regulation imposes. 
B. Nuisance 
In order to establish a taking based on excessive burden, a plaintiff 
must begin by proving that a prohibited use does not amount to a 
public nuisance. 195 If an anticipated use is a public nuisance, the 
government will be free to prohibit the use without compensating 
the owner.196 Unfortunately, there is no bright-line test for deter-
mining nuisance. Rather, nuisance spans a broad spectrum. 
In discussing nuisance this Comment has established three points 
on the spectrum. At one extreme it identified cases involving delib-
erate acts directly inimical to the morals, health, or safety of the 
public. 197 At the middle of the nuisance spectrum were cases involv-
ing acts that only became nuisances because they were carried on in 
inappropriate settings. These cases presented dangers to the com-
munity, but the dangers were passive, incidental effects of activities 
otherwise accepted as useful and necessary. 198 Finally, delimiting the 
end of the nuisance spectrum, were cases in which acts were pro-
hibited, not to eliminate a nuisance, but in order affirmatively to 
enhance the common welfare. 199 
This section discusses the ramifications of nuisance analysis on 
littoral takings claims. The section begins by considering nuisance 
analysis as it affects the claims of proprietors prevented from re-
building damaged coastal structures. The section concludes by con-
sidering the effect of nuisance analysis on the claims of proprietors 
foreclosed by coastal-management laws from constructing coastal 
barriers. 
Homeowners on South Carolina's Outer Banks face the prospect 
of rebuilding their ruined homes. The reconstruction lacks the char-
acteristics of "first-class" nuisance. A community's views on residen-
195 See supra notes 111-136 and accompanying text. 
196 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 413, 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Mugler 
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887). 
197 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
199 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (prohibition 
of proposed alterations to historic landmark found not a taking, not because alteration would 
create nuisance, but because developer adequately compensated for loss). 
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tial development are quite distinct from its outlook on, for example, 
the distribution of controlled substances or impure foods. Society 
encourages home ownership, but does not countenance these latter 
dangerous activities. Had the homes represented patently noxious 
uses of property injurious to the public welfare, regulators could 
have ordered the homes destroyed as soon as the danger had been 
recognized.2°O That the structures were allowed to stand until de-
stroyed by natural disaster demonstrates the regulator's recognition 
that residential use of beach front property is not a "first-class" 
nuisance. 201 
Whether the residential use of littoral property like that foreclosed 
by South Carolina's coastal-management act fits the definition of a 
"second-class" nuisance is a more difficult problem. Littoral resi-
dences may have substantial impact on the coastal environment. Like 
the uses in Hadachek and Goldblatt,202 rebuilding ruined structures 
in the "dead zone"203 may appear to be a case of a generally accept-
able use becoming a nuisance when it is carried on in an inappropriate 
place. 
The fact that littoral residential use presents an insignificant dan-
ger to the health or material well being of the community, however, 
tends to undermine this interpretation. As long as littoral residents 
are not allowed to protect their properties with coastal engineering 
structures, the costs of littoral residential development are largely 
confined to the deterioration of coastal aesthetics and an increased 
burden on a community's infrastructure. 
It is important to recognize, however, that the relevant measure 
of these costs to the community is the marginal cost of littoral 
residential use over residential use in other areas. Because aesthetics 
may suffer wherever a community allows residential development, 
the aesthetic cost of littoral development is a weak ground for deny-
ing littoral proprietors the right to rebuild their homes.204 Likewise, 
200 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. 
201 Clearly there are many reasons, fairness and political considerations among them, why 
regulators would be reluctant to raze their constituents' houses. Such reluctance could be 
expected to be vitiated substantially if littoral proprietors could be considered to be deliber-
ately devoting their properties to uses directly inimical to the health or morals of the public. 
See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra note 123. 
20S See supra note 58. 
204 Regulators leave themselves open to charges of arbitrary and capricious legislation if 
they attempt to justify coastal management regulations solely on aesthetic grounds. Who is 
to say that a priva,te residence nestled in the dunes is more or less of an aesthetic burden 
than a condominium development in a cornfield? 
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all residential development increases the burden on a community's 
infrastructure. Undeniably, littoral residents require more frequent 
and more costly rescue operations. Because their property is gen-
erally more valuable than similar property inland, however, coastal 
residents pay proportionately more of the taxes that support the 
services on which they rely. 
The costs of littoral residential use are diffuse and widely distrib-
uted. It is unlikely that littoral residential use would imminently 
endanger the interests of a clearly identifiable segment of the com-
munity to the extent described in Goldblatt or Hadachek. 
Reconstruction of damaged houses along the South Carolina shore 
does not square with any ordinary concept of public nuisance. Thus, 
courts probably will analyze takings suits arising out of hurricane 
Hugo's aftermath under the assumption that the underlying motive 
of the South Carolina coastal-management laws is to secure~an affir-
mative benefit for the citizens of South Carolina. In all likelihood 
these homeowners' claims will pass the nuisance threshold test. Net 
cost analysis will be necessary to determine their outcome. 
Littoral proprietors who wish to erect erosion barriers, on the 
other hand, are likely to have difficulty overcoming the initial nuis-
ance threshold. While erecting erosion barriers like those anticipated 
by the Chatham homeowners does not arise to the level of "first-
class" nuisance, such use may square well with what we have labeled 
"second-class" nuisance. Protective devices erected on one part of 
the coast can cause accelerated erosion on other parts.205 For that 
reason, the devices may present a danger to communities in the 
downstream littoral drift. The danger is an incidental effect of an 
activity that in another location might be perfectly acceptable. The 
mere fact that a . hazard is not deliberate, however, will not have 
much influence in the courtS. 206 When regulators predicate prohibi-
tions on the threat of downstream erosion, littoral proprietors will 
have to rebut a presumption of nuisance in order to be heard on 
their takings claims. 207 
Rebutting the presumption that a proposed erosion barrier would 
create a nuisance may be difficult, considering the capricious nature 
of littoral erosion and accretion. A small group of littoral proprietors 
205 Howe, supra note 42, at 72, col 2. For a general discussion of the effects of protective 
devices, see W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 4, at 207-12, and S. LEATHERMAN, supra 
note 11, at 89-104. 
206 See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 111-136 and accompanying text. 
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hampered by limited financial and technical resources for litigation 
might find rebutting a presumption of nuisance impossible. Thus, 
whether or not a barrier would in fact be a nuisance, littoral pro-
prietors may find their rights to defend their property foreclosed 
and that, as a result, they lack standing to bring a takings claim. 
It is essential for proprietors whose rights to defend their prop-
erties have been foreclosed to overcome the nuisance exception. 
These proprietors must show that because of geography or barrier 
design, a proposed defensive structure poses no threat to others. If 
they carry this burden, then they should find themselves in the more 
comfortable position, regarding the nuisance exception, of those pro-
prietors who are prevented from rebuilding. If they are unable to 
prove that their proposed use will not create a nuisance, however, 
analysis of their claims will be truncated and the outcome will favor 
the regulator. 208 
C. Net Cost Analysis: Is the Burden on the Property Owner 
Excessive? 
Economic costs of rebuilding prohibitions and prohibitions against 
the construction of protective devices are often substantial. Prohib-
itions against protective structures can make it impossible for littoral 
proprietors to avoid property loss. Proprietors prevented from re-
building face severe diminution losses. Additionally, either class of 
plaintiff may incur significant opportunity costs if their property has 
been used to produce income. 
The magnitude of economic cost depends on the particular situa-
tion of the regulated property. Losses may be very high, even 
amounting to a property's full value, where severe erosion is occur-
ring and protective measures are prohibited. On the other hand, 
some properties merely will be threatened by potential erosion. 
Others will suffer minor erosion, the negative effects of which are 
primarily aesthetic. In these cases, the value of property lost due to 
prohibitions against defensive structures will be moderate to non-
existent. 
Where damaged structures cannot be repaired or rebuilt, dimin-
ution in property value is likely to be extreme. Waterfront homes 
are some of the most valuable and desirable properties along the 
nation's seaboards.209 While undeveloped property is beautiful and 
fOB Id. 
,.", W. KAUFMAN & O. PILKEY, supra note 4, at 224. 
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may be useful for sunbathing, bird watching, fishing and other ac-
tivities, buyers are unlikely to pay a substantial premium for those 
privileges alone. To a great extent, the value of shore property is a 
product of what can be built on it. 
Finally, shore property can bring very substantial rental premi-
ums, especially during the summer months. 210 Destroyed or immi-
nently threatened houses cannot be rented. Thus, regulation may 
impose substantial opportunity losses on owners who derive income 
from their littoral holdings. 
Prohibitions against rebuilding or the construction of protective 
devices may interfere significantly with littoral proprietors' present 
or expected uses of property. When a house is destroyed or immi-
nently threatened, it will be unfit for habitation. The inability to 
rebuild or repair a house, or to protect property from erosion, pre-
cludes further residential use. Interference with a prior existing use 
is not dispositive of the takings claim, but courts may consider it an 
onerous burden to proprietors.211 At the very least, interference with 
a prior existing use precludes a court from justifying an uncompen-
sated taking on the theory that original use is unimpaired. The 
degree of interference with an existing use will vary with the cir-
cumstances of each case. Some properties will be affected or threat-
ened by erosion only slightly. Regulations will not interfere with 
present or expected uses of these properties. Such interference im-
poses no significant cost on these owners. 
Regulations also may extinguish all economically feasible remain-
ing uses of property. The clearest example is when unchecked ero-
sion actually destroys a piece of real estate. When the land no longer 
exists, no court will be able to find a remaining use for it. Remaining 
use analysis is less obvious when rebuilding is prohibited, but the 
land itself is unaffected. A court might find the proprietors' remain-
ing privileges-to sunbathe, swim, and fish from their piece of sea-
shore-are economically feasible remaining uses. 212 Nonetheless, a 
court at all sympathetic to proprietors would have to recognize that 
remaining use is severely curtailed when regulations prohibit recon-
struction. 
210 See, e.g., Brisbane, supra note 57, at 3A, col. 2. 
211 See supra notes 150-155 and accompanying text. 
212 That courts may reach such a conclusion is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). The Andrus Court found the possibility of charging 
admission to view Native American artifacts a reasonable remaining use of inventory held for 
sale by a dealer in antiquities, when sale of such artifacts was foreclosed by a federal statute. 
[d. at 66. 
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The final factor in cost analysis is risk acceptance. It is tempting 
to argue that littoral proprietors knew or should have known of the 
risks of building on the shore and that they are, therefore, entitled 
to little sympathy. This argument, however, begs the question. Pro-
prietors are not bringing suit to recover the costs of disaster damage. 
By building at the seashore, they demonstrated a willingness to risk 
economic losses due to natural events. Rather, they are trying to 
recover the costs imposed by restrictive regulations that prohibit 
them from protecting or reconstructing their properties.213 If regu-
lations were not in effect when proprietors purchased and developed 
their properties, the risk that they would later be adopted ordinarily 
would not be reflected in purchase prices. Therefore, affected pro-
prietors can make a strong argument that there is no inherent justice 
in requiring them to bear the costs of regulation.214 
In fact, the risk factor should not be an issue in takings suits 
involving rebuilding prohibitions. If development preceded regula-
tion, then "regulatory risk" was not a factor and cannot be used to 
weaken plaintiffs' cases. If regulations were in effect and reflected 
a legitimate governmental purpose, then construction should not 
have been permitted. No doubt there could be cases that fall into 
the interstices; perhaps when property was purchased for develop-
ment and regulations were adopted before development was com-
plete. These cases would have to be analyzed by applying risk prin-
ciples to the specific situation. 
Acceptance of risk could be an important, even a dispositive factor, 
in one situation. A proprietor might purchase a lot for development 
knowing in advance that regulations permit development but pro-
hibit constructing defensive devices.215 The purchase price for the 
lot would be decreased to reflect the prohibition. If such property is 
swept away by erosion, and regulations prohibit defense, the pro-
213 Confusing these two types of risk could lead to the unwarranted assumption that 
insurance might have an impact on takings analysis. Insurance might compensate a littoral 
proprietor for property damage resulting from natural events. It would not compensate for 
destruction of property value resulting from governmental regulation. Thus, insurance has no 
direct influence on the adjudication of takings claims. 
214 A counter-argument is that if proprietors recognize and compensate for the risk that 
their property may be destroyed, they also could be expected to recognize and compensate 
for the risk that their property may be regulated. The risk of destruction is empirically 
quantifiable. Assessing the risk of regulation, however, depends on accurately reading the 
intangibles of social and political climate at a given place and time. Nevertheless, this counter-
argument gains strength as coastal management regulations become more commonplace. 
216 Section 48-39-300 of the South Carolina Code of Laws is one example of a regulation 
with this effect. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. 1976) 
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prietor should have no standing in a taking action against the reg-
ulator. 
Proprietors affected by prohibitions against rebuilding and con-
structing protective barriers will realize certain benefits along with 
the costs. Particular ordinances or statutes may contain provisions 
for compensation.216 When this is the case, the value of compensation 
would help to offset costs. Moreover, assuming a regulation furthers 
legitimate governmental purposes, it would generate indirect bene-
fits. To the extent that a regulation effectively enhances the coastal 
environment, society-at-Iarge benefits. Coastal residents are in a 
position to capture particular benefit. To the extent that rebuilding 
is prohibited, the immediate environment becomes less crowded. 
Newly undeveloped land provides better access to the ocean. Views 
may improve. Birds may move into the area in greater numbers 
improving bird-watching and hunting opportunities. In coastal 
towns, traffic problems may be ameliorated. A very substantial in-
crease in the value of existing housing is likely to result from the 
dwindling supply. 
These particular benefits, however, are only available to those 
who remain in residence on the coast. Most of these will be propri-
etors fortunate enough to have avoided the regulatory prohibitions 
or at least the destructive forces of nature at the shore. Those who 
suffered serious disaster losses probably will have to resettle in less 
expensive inland areas. The government's failure to compensate thus 
may be compounded by foreclosing to these proprietors the oppor-
tunity to live in a coastal environment improved at their expense. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has developed a framework and method for ex-
amining takings suits engendered when coastal-management stat-
utes or ordinances prevent littoral proprietors from protecting their 
properties from erosion, or from rebuilding damaged or destroyed 
structures. Two factors are critical in determining the outcome of 
the suits described. The first is the determination of whether an 
owner's anticipated use amounts to a public nuisance. If a proposed 
use is unreasonable, and thus amounts to a nuisance, then an owner 
216 No statute the author has examined contains such a provision. The Boston Globe, 
however, reported that a proposal was made to the selectmen of the Town of Chatham to 
compensate affected littoral proprietors by providing alternate lots in the town. Longcope, 
Sea Prepares Bitter Lesson for Cape Homeowners, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1988, at 42, col. 
4. 
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will not be able to successfully press a takings claim. While there is 
no bright-line test for nuisance, the essential element of nuisance is 
the presence of an affirmative danger to the health, welfare or morals 
of a community. Merely denying the community a positive benefit is 
not enough to create a nuisance. 
The second critical factor in determining the outcome of a littoral 
takings suit is the net cost of regulation to the affected proprietor. 
When an owner's anticipated use survives the nuisance threshold 
test, and is thus a reasonable use, the government incurs an obli-
gation to compensate the owner for the value of the property taken 
or the property right infringed. This compensation need not be in 
the form of money. Rather, the regulatory statute or ordinance may, 
either directly or indirectly, tend to compensate the owner's loss. 
Considering the variety of factors that must be considered in 
analyzing a takings claim, it is clear that no single assessment will 
serve for all, or even for most, cases. This Comment clarifies the 
necessary considerations and explains the connections between 
them. It will enable those contemplating pressing or defending a 
littoral takings suit to assess the steps necessary to maximize the 
likelihood that they will succeed. 
